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ABSTRACT
Automated influence, delivered by digital targeting technologies
such as targeted advertising, digital nudges, and recommender
systems, has attracted significant interest from both empirical re-
searchers, on one hand, and critical scholars and policymakers on
the other. In this paper, we argue for closer integration of these
efforts. Critical scholars and policymakers, who focus primarily on
the social, ethical, and political effects of these technologies, need
empirical evidence to substantiate and motivate their concerns.
However, existing empirical research investigating the effective-
ness of these technologies (or lack thereof), neglects other morally
relevant effects—which can be felt regardless of whether or not
the technologies “work” in the sense of fulfilling the promises of
their designers. Drawing from the ethics and policy literature, we
enumerate a range of questions begging for empirical analysis—the
outline of a research agenda bridging these fields—and issue a call
to action for more empirical research that takes these urgent ethics
and policy questions as their starting point.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and pri-
vacy; • Human-centered computing → HCI design and evalua-
tion methods.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Researchers, policymakers, and activists have raised the alarm about
the harms of automated influence. Framed by their developers as
tools for delivering personalized digital experiences tailored to the
preferences and desires of individual users, targeted advertising,
digital nudges, recommender systems, and other influence tech-
nologies, threaten—at the same time—to extract higher rents [14],
unjustly discriminate [71], mislead and polarize [64], and interfere
in both individual and collective decision-making [112]. Frequently
driven by artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms
(AI/ML), such technologies are especially concerning because au-
tomation enables influence that is simultaneously individually tai-
lored and massive in scale [87].
Shoshana Zuboff has made what is perhaps the most urgent
case against these forms of influence, arguing that the firms build-
ing them have fundamentally re-shaped the economy into what
she terms “surveillance capitalism,” and have enacted a new form
of power—“instrumentarian power”—which, she claims, utilizes
digital influence tools to engage in large-scale “behavior modifica-
tion” [112]. Whether or not one accepts Zuboff’s whole story, the
suspicion at its center—that digital influence threatens cherished
individual and social values—is widely shared. Others warn about
the potential harms of “digital market manipulation” [14], “online
manipulation” [87], an “emergent limbic media system” [20], and a
“weaponized digital influence machine” [64]. Which is to say, for
many observers the influences digital technologies enable raise
deep social, ethical, and political questions.
Not everyone is worried, though. Predictably, industry actors
contend that these technologies simply respond to consumer de-
mand. Regarding targeted advertising, for example, Facebook CEO
Mark Zuckerberg has publicly argued that “People consistently tell
us that if they’re going to see ads, they want them to be relevant.
That means we need to understand their interests” [113]. Putting
aside the fact that survey research by prominent privacy scholars
casts doubt on these claims about public opinion, Zuckerberg’s
argument implies that if there is any downside to these tools it is
worth it, on balance, to consumers who consent (at least tacitly) to
data collection, targeting, and related digital practices when they
accept Facebook and other platforms’ privacy policies and terms of
service [96]. But the nature and significance of these costs are not
yet well understood, and when consumers are informed about how
targeted advertising technologies work they have tended to register
significant “discomfort” with it, especially in certain domains, such
as political advertising [95].
Interestingly, some critical scholars and industry watchers are
equally unconcerned, arguing that the above debates are beside the
point, because digital influence tools don’t even work. On this view,
concerns about digital influence reflect an uncritical acceptance—by
researchers and policymakers—of the technology industry’s own
claims regarding the effectiveness of its products. These criticisms
are important, if only because they encourage more careful, re-
flexive scholarship. However, they tend to be more responsive to
unhelpful straw men derived from popular media (such as the idea,
perpetuated by the Netflix film The Social Dilemma, that the threat
of targeted advertising is a kind of “mind control”), than to the
actual arguments advanced in ethics research. More often than not,
one encounters these arguments informally, during discussions at
conferences and on social media, rather than in peer-reviewed pub-
lications and other traditional venues for disseminating research.
But some published work advancing this type of argument is begin-
ning to emerge [23, 38]. Usually, the digital influence technology
these critics question is targeted advertising—whether they believe
other influence technologies, such as recommender systems and
“digital nudges,” are also unconcerning is unclear.
What both these worries and responses demonstrate is the need
for robust empirical research investigating digital influence. The-
oretical work has been valuable for identifying, defining, and mo-
tivating these problems, but to marshal a meaningful response
policymakers and the public need to know more about the actual
capabilities of these technologies, and about the nature, range, and
scope of their effects. Here, there is good news and bad news. The
good news is a large body of related empirical research, spanning
multiple disciplines, already exists. The bad news is the findings
tell a mixed and context-specific story. Measuring influence is ex-
tremely difficult—people make choices for any number of reasons,
and isolating the effects of particular influences, especially outside
experimental contexts, is a challenge. Rarely able to directly de-
tect “effectiveness,” researchers instead explore a variety of proxies.
They find that some influence technologies work, to some extent,
in some contexts. Others, in other contexts, don’t.
More significantly, many of the ethical concerns critical scholars
raise are independent of questions about effectiveness. Which is
to say, some highly effective automated influence technologies
might be perfectly acceptable, while others could be harmful even
if they don’t work as promised. Influence, on its face, is neither good
nor bad—we are all unavoidably influenced in myriad ways. What
critical scholars worry about is how technologies influence people
and whose interests such influence serves. For empirical research to
advance our understanding of the ethics of automated influence, it
needs to investigate the specific issues ethics and policy scholars
identify.
In this paper, we further these discussions in two ways. First, we
explore the empirical literature on a range of influence technolo-
gies to provide a broad overview of the landscape of automated
influence, some of the ways empirical scholars have tried to mea-
sure the effectiveness of these technologies, and a sense of their
findings. Given the breadth and depth of this literature, our analysis
is not comprehensive; still, we are able to extract a number of use-
ful insights.1 Second, we discuss ethical concerns critical scholars
and policymakers have raised about automated influence, identify
empirical questions they generate, and highlight research that has
begun to investigate these questions. In doing so, we hope to in-
spire a kind of call to action, motivating new empirical research that
speaks more directly to the urgent ethics and policy discussions
currently underway.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss three
forms of automated influence: targeted advertising, digital nudging,
and recommender systems.We situate these technologies in illustra-
tive application domains—e.g., commercial and political advertising,
health and sustainability nudges, and dark patterns. And we explore
empirical research that investigates these technologies, with an eye
toward the concrete questions researchers are asking. In Section
3, we turn to the ethics and policy literatures. We discuss worries
about privacy, autonomy, economic and epistemic harms. Finally,
in Section 4, we begin to operationalize these worries in terms of
measurable empirical questions, sketching a research agenda that
could deepen our understanding of these problems and, perhaps,
guide our responses.
2 THE LANDSCAPE OF AUTOMATED
INFLUENCE
We are influenced by technology in uncountably many ways, many
unintentional. Our focus in this paper is not on the totality of digital
influence; rather, our aim is to map technologies designed intention-
ally to influence, and to ask how the effects of such influence are
and might be measured. More specifically, we draw attention to the
question of automated influence—the use of technologies driven by
machine learning (ML) or artificial intelligence (AI) to individually
tailor influence strategies at scale [76].
“Artificial intelligence” (AI) is a famously slippery concept, often
deployed more for the sake of marketing than taxonomic precision.
For our purposes, what is significant about the various computing
strategies usually collected under the “AI” umbrella (including ma-
chine learning) is that they facilitate the real-time automation of
influence. By “influence,” we mean intervening to change a person’s
beliefs, desires, emotions, and/or behaviors [87]. Thus, automated
influence technologies are technologies that automate the com-
plicated work of changing what people think, want, feel, and do.
They are, as Latour might say, a means of “delegating” this work of
influencing to machines [48].
The term “automated influence” will conjure, for many readers,
images of targeted advertising. And not without reason—advertisers
have always been in the influence business, and the promise of ap-
plying new technologies to the problem of selling things has been a
significant driver of the technology industry’s interest in this field
[73, 105]. But targeted advertising is not the only technology de-
signed to influence our behavior, and inducing people to buy things
is not the only end automated influence serves. Automated influ-
ence takes on a variety of forms, is found in a range of application
domains, and seeks to further a number of different ends.
1This section draws on a more comprehensive, systematic literature review, currently
underway.
In this section, we begin to map this terrain. We identify three
types of automated influence: targeted advertising, digital nudges,
and recommender systems. We describe various contexts they are
applied in and ends they are designed to serve—e.g., commerce,
health, environmental sustainability, and politics. We examine the
kinds of questions empirical scholars tend to ask about these tech-
nologies, and how they conceptualize and measure their effective-
ness.
2.1 Targeted Advertising
“Targeted advertising” (sometimes referred to as “behavioral ad-
vertising,” “online behavioral advertising,” or “personalized online
advertising”) designates a range of technologies that tailor adver-
tisements to individuals, either by matching them with particular
ads (“segmenting” audiences), or by shaping ads to suit them. While
the language of “advertising” suggests the familiar display ad—text,
images, or videos appearing alongside search results and other
online content—targeted advertising comes in many varieties, in-
cluding so-called “native ads” (advertisements designed to blend
in with non-advertising content), targeted marketing emails, and
other digital appeals.
No different, in principle, from television, magazine or billboard
advertising, the special promise of targeted advertising is its preci-
sion [17]. By collecting and analyzing vast amounts of information
about each of us—our needs, desires, preferences, and interests, our
spending power, our previous purchasing behaviors and the pur-
chasing behaviors of people like us—targeted advertising attempts
to deliver just the right message to just the right person at just the
right time to maximize its influence [41]. As Joseph Turow writes,
“Advertisers in the digital space expect all media firms to deliver to
them particular types of individuals—and, increasingly, particular
individuals—by leveraging a detailed knowledge about them and
their behaviors that was unheard of even a few years ago” [94, p.
12, emphasis in original].
Ad targeting technologies range in sophistication. Contextual
advertisements simply target people based on the content they are
viewing. Google search results, for example, are often accompanied
by ads targeted to the search terms users enter [111]. Behavioral
advertising, by contrast, leverages more—and more specific—data,
aggregated in consumer “profiles," to configure the ads each person
sees. Profiles combine demographic information (e.g., age, gender,
and income) with information about each person’s actual online
behavior (e.g., web browsing history, search history, and online
shopping history) to deliver advertisements that appeal to specific
individuals, rather than to the content they are viewing [7]. Promis-
ing even greater precision—and effectiveness—“psychographic pro-
filing” involves advertisements tailored not just to demographic
and behavioral information, but to a person’s specific psychological
traits. For example, an advertisement might appeal to “consensus”
(“This product is a best seller!”), “authority,” (“Recommended by
experts!”), or “scarcity” (“Only one left in stock!”), depending on
which is predicted to best align with the target’s psychological
dispositions [41, 44]. These techniques have been used in a range
of application domains, most prominent among them e-commerce
and politics.
2.1.1 Commercial Advertising. Obviously, a central purpose of tar-
geted advertising is to influence consumer behavior—to sell things—
and researchers have long tried to measure how well it works [99].
Measuring real-world purchasing behavior is difficult, because ad-
vertising platforms, such as Facebook and Google, carefully guard
user data [17, 38]. What research exists suggests that targeted adver-
tisements are relatively more effective than non-targeted ads—one
prominent study, for example, found that advertisements targeted
to psychographic traits are nearly 50% more effective than generic
ads [57]. In absolute terms, the effects were extremely modest, with
even targeted advertisements only leading to “conversion”—i.e.,
purchases—less than 1% of the time. Given the scale and reach au-
tomation enables, however, such figures could be misleading: 1% of
millions or billions of viewers is a lot. The advertisements in this
experiment reached over 3.5 million people.
Lacking the data required tomeasure real-world purchases, many
researchers rely on lab experiments or survey instruments instead,
and attempt tomeasure advertising effectiveness indirectly via prox-
ies, such as “click-through rates” (i.e., how often someone presented
with an ad clicks on it) [5, 26, 43, 50], self-reported intention to pur-
chase [40, 98], or how much subjects are willing to pay for a given
product [42]. Some utilize eye-tracking technology to measure how
long a display ad commands a lab subject’s attention, suggesting
that the more time someone spends looking at an ad the more ef-
fective it is [53]. These studies reach a range of conclusions—from
little evidence of targeting effectiveness, to evidence of significant
effects, to finding that targeting can have negative effects, backfiring
when users perceive it as too intrusive.
2.1.2 Political Advertising. People are increasingly aware that tar-
geted advertising technologies have moved beyond the commercial
sphere and entered the realm of politics. Scandals, such as the Face-
book/Cambridge Analytica affair, have brought the stakes of this
movement to light.2 Just as targeted ads in the consumer realm are
best understood as an evolution of older commercial advertising
practices, so too is digital political advertising an old practice in
new form [49]. But more data, increasingly sophisticated statistical
modeling techniques, and greater access to individuals via digi-
tal platforms mean political campaigns can deliver more precisely
tailored digital advertisements than ever before [92].
As in the case of commercial advertising, many empirical schol-
ars have sought to determine just how effective these advertise-
ments are. Since the intention is to influence political behavior,
rather than consumer behavior, however, “effectiveness” is con-
ceptualized differently in this context. The objective of targeted
political advertisements is generally either (1) to increase voter
support for a candidate or position, or (2) to increase voter par-
ticipation rates amongst existing supporters. To determine how
effective political advertisements are at achieving these objectives,
political scientists turn to a variety of empirical strategies. Again,
the results are mixed.
Some researchers have explored these questions in experimental
settings. For example, Zarouali et al. developed a mock social media
platform to test whether psychographically targeted political ads
were more persuasive than generic ones, and find that to a signifi-
cant degree they were [109]. Some attempt to measure such effects
2See, e.g., https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files.
more directly: Valenzuela and Michelson use randomized control
experiments to measure the impacts of tailored messages on voter
turnout (finding that certain kinds of identity appeals do increase
turnout), and validate the results using real-world turnout data [97].
Others attempt to measure these phenomena indirectly, relying
on survey instruments that inquire about voter intention. Gerber
et al. demonstrate that certain kinds of psychographic targeting
can increase expressions of intention to vote [31]. And Dixon et al.
show that targeted appeals can increase expressions of support for
policies to combat climate change [22].
By contrast, however, Krotzek finds that while targeted appeals
can improve the way people feel about a candidate, they do not in-
crease the likelihood that they will express an intention to vote for
them [45]. Moreover, others find that mistargeting—i.e., delivering
targeted appeals that are incongruous with a voter’s identity—can
lead to voters “penalizing” the candidate. Hersh and Schaffner,
for example, find that ads targeted at born-again Christians can
increase their support for the advertised candidate, but when the
same ads are delivered to non-born-again Christians they decreased
the target’s support for the candidate by an even more significant
margin [36]. Flores and Coppock demonstrate similar effects us-
ing advertisements tailored to English- versus Spanish-speaking
audiences [28].
2.2 Digital Nudges
A second form of automated influence that has generated consider-
able interest amongst both researchers and policymakers is digital
nudging [16, 102]. Following Thaler and Sunstein, nudges are “any
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in
a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly
changing their economic incentives” [89]. The insight behind nudg-
ing is that decision-making is deeply influenced by decision-making
contexts—by the way options are presented and arranged. Thus, by
making subtle changes to these contexts, or “choice architectures,”
it is possible to influence the choices people make.
Thaler and Sunstein describe a variety of nudges designed to
gently coax people toward individually or socially beneficial deci-
sions, such as placing healthy foods at eye-level in cafeterias while
placing junk foods slightly out of reach (to encourage healthy eat-
ing), enrolling people in social programs by default and allowing
them to opt out, rather than the reverse (to encourage, for exam-
ple, saving for retirement), and so on. While these examples are
relatively low-tech, there are digital parallels. BJ Fogg conceptual-
ized digital systems as “persuasive technologies,”3 and called for
increased attention to “the design, research, and analysis of inter-
active computing products created for the purposes of changing
people’s attitudes and behaviors” [29]. Unlike brick-and-mortar
cafeterias, digital environments are personalizable—they are “adap-
tive choice architectures” that can be tailored to each individual
user [85]. Leveraging the same data-rich profiles advertisers use,
the designers of digital systems can deploy “nimble, unobtrusive
and highly potent” digital nudges, which Karen Yeung calls “hyper-
nudges” [107].
Like their analog counterparts, digital nudges come in many
different forms and are designed to serve a number of different
3Though many might be more aptly called “manipulative technologies.”
ends. We illustrate by way of two examples: (1) personalized health
and sustainability nudges and (2) dark patterns.
2.2.1 Health and Sustainability Nudges. Smartphones, wearables
(e.g., fitness trackers and smart watches), smart home devices, and
other internet of things (IoT) technologies have become pervasive,
enabling both constant monitoring of our activity and delivery of
personalized nudges designed to guide it. Toward what ends is
an open question [80]. Two application domains where research
and development around digital nudges have drawn significant
enthusiasm and attention are health and sustainability [61].
Health nudges promise to help people eat less, exercise more,
stop smoking, and take their medicine. Like a health professional—
say, a nutritionist or exercise coach—who is always on hand to offer
advice and encouragement tailored to each person’s needs, desires,
and tendencies, these automated influence technologies attempt
to deliver nudges optimized for each individual’s specific health
conditions and attuned to the particular kinds of interventions
they are likely to find most persuasive. Importantly, automated
personalization of nudges means interventions can target not just
broad and “nonmodifiable” demographic characteristics, such as age,
gender, and socioeconomic status, but more specific and predictive
“modifiable” factors, such as available social supports, stress levels,
and health literacy [82].
Research exploring the effectiveness of these techniques is wide-
ranging, utilizing a variety of proxies to measure success. Using sur-
vey instruments, some researchers point to “end-user appreciation”
(i.e., stated preference) of targeted interventions over generic ones
as evidence of effectiveness [100]. More sophisticated, lab-based
randomized control trials analyzing a combination of automatically
detected and user-logged diet and exercise data, find preliminary
evidence that personalized interventions increase exercise [75]. A
review of studies investigating the effects of tailored messaging
on user-reported physical activity finds some evidence that tai-
lored messages yielded better results than generic messages [47],
as did a review of studies that measured the effects of tailored diet
interventions on actual weight loss and weight maintenance [2].
Digital nudges designed to encourage more environmentally-
friendly behavior have also attracted interest. Researchers have
explored how effectively digital nudges can curtail aggressive driv-
ing (a significant contributor to excessive fuel consumption) [8, 30,
83, 93], encourage adherence to detour suggestions that reduce fuel
consumption [106], and reduce car usage overall, in favor of more
environmentally sustainable options [9], finding in many cases that
such nudges generate meaningful behavior change.
2.2.2 Dark Patterns. Finally, designers, researchers, and policymak-
ers have become increasingly concerned about a more troubling
approach to constructing digital environments known as “dark pat-
terns.” These are user interface design strategies that “knowingly
confuse users, make it difficult for users to express their actual
preferences, or manipulate users into taking certain actions” [51],
or alternatively, cases where “designers use their knowledge of
human behavior (e.g., psychology) and the desires of end users to
implement deceptive functionality that is not in the user’s best
interest” [34]. A well-known example is free trial memberships that
require credit card information up front, and then automatically
convert to paid memberships at the end of the trial period, taking
advantage of the fact that many will likely forget to cancel. Harry
Brignull, who coined the term dark patterns, calls this “forced con-
tinuity” [10]. Or consider retail websites that nudge shoppers into
making quicker (and thus less deliberative) decisions by displaying
countdown timers or misleading stock reports, like “Only 1 left!”
Dark patterns emerged, Narayanan et al. argue, from the in-
tegration of nudge research with long-standing deceptive retail
practices, and their adoption has been driven by the technology
industry’s imperative to achieve market growth at all costs [66].
Although there is only limited empirical research on dark patterns,
existing findings are illuminating. To understand the scale of these
practices, researchers at Princeton University and the University
of Chicago analyzed 11K shopping websites and discovered 1,818
individual instances of dark patterns [55]. And in what appears
to be the only controlled experiment yet conducted to test the ef-
fectiveness of dark patterns, researchers recruited unsuspecting
experimental subjects into an elaborate, large-scale simulation of
dark patterns tactics, finding that common dark patterns can sig-
nificantly impact people’s choices [51]. Importantly, dark patterns
have been deployed in a variety of application domains beyond
e-commerce. Researchers have identified dark patterns designed
to encourage users to disclose personal information (“privacy dark
patterns”) [13], dark patterns in games [108], and dark patterns in
human-robot interaction [46].
2.3 Recommender Systems
Both targeted advertising and digital nudges are intended primarily
to influence. That’s their purpose. Recommender systems differ
in that they are designed, first and foremost, to help people sort
through the vast quantities of information, entertainment, products,
and services available online. Recommender systems evolved “in
parallel with the web,” becoming increasingly important for navi-
gating it as information and other content proliferated online [6].
Today, they are one of the central mechanisms for organizing online
content, sorting everything from Google search results to Amazon
product suggestions, Facebook timelines to New York Times news
feeds, Spotify playlists to Netflix movie recommendations [17]. But
which items are surfaced and how they are sorted—which websites
are indexed by a search engine, for example, and how product rec-
ommendations are arranged on a page—can powerfully influence
the people who rely on these systems to navigate digital life [39].
People might assume that the recommender systems organiz-
ing their social media feeds, surfacing interesting news articles,
and serving up streaming TV shows are guided by some objective,
measurable conception of relevance. And while that was more or
less true in the early years of recommender systems, things have
since changed behind-the-scenes. According to anthropologist Nick
Seaver, the effectiveness of recommender systems was originally
measured against a straightforwardmetric called root mean squared
error (RMSE): “a recommender system predicts how users will rate
items, and it is judged by how accurate its predictions were” [81].
In other words, an “effective” recommender system was defined
as one that successfully delivered what a user actually wanted to
read or watch on TV. Over time, however, as the business model
of the internet changed, and as researchers found it increasingly
difficult to improve predictive accuracy, “RMSE was dethroned as
the paradigmatic measure of success” and replaced by measures
of engagement—a successful recommendation defined as one that
keeps user attention on the platform [81].
Of course, there is nothing wrong, in principle, with trying to
engage people. The reason this history is relevant to the present
discussion is that it illustrates a potential disjuncture between the
real and perceived organizing principles behind many content rec-
ommender systems. Technology companies describe these systems,
and users perceive them—if they notice them at all4—as engines
of user satisfaction that deliver to people the content they want.
When in reality, these systems may be trying to influence them.
Many product recommender systems operate according to a
similar logic [19]. When someone visits Amazon’s website they
may perceive its product recommendations as neutral, objective
suggestions. In fact, Amazon prioritizes its own private label prod-
ucts, encouraging shoppers to buy the items most profitable to the
company [24]. Google does the same when presenting its search
results [68]. Both companies face regulatory scrutiny because of
the perceived unfairness of these practices [32]. A report by the UK
government’s Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation argues that,
“As with personalised advertising, recommendation systems can be
optimised to serve different business goals” [17].
Empirically measuring the effectiveness of recommender sys-
tems thus requires, first, clarifying what goals—whose goals—the
system is trying to accomplish. Are the content recommendations
made by a social media algorithm “effective” when they are maxi-
mally engaging (keeping user eyeballs glued to screens), or when
they deliver information and entertainment users find useful, en-
riching, and informative? Are “effective” product recommender
systems those that maximize profits or those that help users find
and purchase the things they most want, need, and value?
3 THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE
To be influenced is neither good nor bad—it is a pervasive, un-
avoidable condition. Every person’s beliefs, desires, emotions, and
behavior are shaped by incalculably many influences, some (like
those discussed here) intentionally inflicted, others the product
of accident or circumstance. We can be influenced in ways that
make us (individually and collectively) better or worse off. And
being an independent decision-maker—which many view as a nor-
mative ideal—does not mean being free from influence; it means
understanding, more or less, how we are influenced, being able
to critically reflect on the reasons motivating us, and ultimately
endorsing our choices.
From this vantage point, some automated influence technologies
are obviously nefarious. Dark patterns, for example, as their name
suggests, seem indefensible on any imaginable ethical grounds. Oth-
ers, though—e.g., targeted advertising, some forms of digital nudg-
ing, and especially recommender systems—are more complex. On
one hand, they undoubtedly provide certain benefits. As we’ve seen,
recommender systems help us navigate otherwise overwhelming
gluts of information, products, and online content. Digital nudges
4In a 2018 survey, Pew Research found that more than half of Facebook users reoprted
they did not understand why they were shown the particular content in their feeds.
See https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/05/many-facebook-users-dont-
understand-how-the-sites-news-feed-works/
can encourage us to behave in ways that are healthier and more en-
vironmentally sustainable. Targeted advertising surfaces products
relevant to our preferences and interests, and more importantly, it
pays for other services people value.
On the other hand, many worry that along with whatever good
they do, these influence technologies can also cause a variety of
harms. The data collection that fuels them raises significant privacy
concerns. The way they influence people could threaten individ-
ual autonomy. Targets of automated influence can suffer economic
and epistemic harms. Determining if and when automated influ-
ence is morally acceptable requires taking all of these issues into
account, and measuring the morally-relevant impacts of these tech-
nologies requires asking questions about them that go beyond how
effectively they deliver on their promises—beyond questions about
click-through rates and conversions, to questions about the effects
of these technologies on privacy, autonomy, and other ethical val-
ues.
In what follows, we briefly discuss each of these issues. In the
final section we consider how empirical scholarship can help deter-
mine whether, in each case, the good outweighs the bad.
3.1 Privacy
Influence technologies run on personal information. Targeting ad-
vertisements, fine-tuning nudges, and filtering recommendations
requires information about the people on the receiving ends of
these systems. For this reason, these technologies have drawn the
attention of researchers and policymakers concerned about privacy
[3]. Surveying research on the ethics of targeted advertising, for ex-
ample, Varnali finds that “the literature unanimously acknowledges
the fact that the technology that allows tracking individuals as they
surf the Internet and process this data to single-out and deliver
personalized ads has unprecedented potential to violate privacy”
[99].
But privacy is a contested—perhaps an “essentially contested”—
concept, which is to say, there is disagreement about both the harms
privacy violations entail and about the steps necessary to avoid
them [63]. In US law and policy, privacy is generally understood
as an individual’s right to control their personal information [103],
a right which is operationalized in the form of so-called “notice
and consent” procedures [86]. According to this approach, data col-
lection violates privacy when data collectors fail to solicit consent
before capturing and analyzing personal information. By contrast,
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) allows for
data collection when users consent5 or when it is necessary to
fulfill a “legitimate interest.” Whether or not collecting personal
information for the purposes of ad targeting and related practices
meets this “legitimate interests” provision is the subject of debate
[37].
Some believe these approaches fundamentally misunderstand
privacy. Philosopher Helen Nissenbaum, for example, argues that
privacy, generally, should be understood not in terms of individ-
ual consent or organizational interests, but rather as the flow of
information in accordance with shared, context-dependent social
norms—what she calls privacy as “contextual integrity” [69]. On this
5Though the consent procedures GDPR requires are more demanding than in the US
context. See [37].
view, the data collection that fuels targeted advertising threatens
privacy, because it tends to involve data flowing inappropriately.
Information input into search engines, shared on social media, or
gleaned from online shopping is repurposed, often without the data
subject’s knowledge, for targeting [70]. As Nissenbaum and others
point out, this doesn’t mean ad targeting necessarily violates privacy.
Targeting technologies could, for instance, process information lo-
cally on individual machines, rather than transmitting personal
data to third party aggregators [90]. Whether digital nudges and
other automated influence technologies violate or respect privacy
rests on similar questions.
3.2 Autonomy
Concerns about privacy draw attention to the data fueling auto-
mated influence, raising questions about how it is acquired. But
even if all of those worries were resolved, and people were assured
that information about them was captured and analyzed appro-
priately, questions would remain about the influence itself. Chief
among them would be concerns about its effects on individual
autonomy.
Autonomy is the capacity for independent decision-making [77],
and respect for autonomy is a core liberal democratic value [18].
Certain kinds of influence threaten this capacity. For example, co-
ercing people—i.e., forcing them to act a certain way—deprives them
of autonomy [104]. As does manipulating people, which interferes
with their ability to reflect on and reason about their options [84].
However, not all influence is corrosive to autonomy. Persuasion—
offering reasons or incentives to act a certain way—respects au-
tonomy, because it allows the target of influence to consider their
options and decide for themselves [87]. Automated influence invites
worries about autonomy to the extent that it is manipulative or
coercive, rather than persuasive.
A wealth of recent scholarship contends that targeted advertis-
ing can manipulate and even coerce. Zuboff argues that because
it is practically impossible to evade the data collection driving tar-
geted advertising, individuals are forcibly—coercively—subjected
to it [112]. For Calo, insofar as targeted ads exploit cognitive bi-
ases, they involve a kind of “digital market manipulation” [14].
Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum argue that targeted advertising
constitutes “online manipulation” whenever it influences people
covertly—i.e., when individuals aren’t aware that they are being in-
fluenced, towardwhat end, or how [87]. Theseworries are especially
salient in the political context, where threats to voter autonomy
can undermine the integrity of democratic processes [25, 114].
Nudging—digital and otherwise—has also raised autonomy con-
cerns, though there is significant disagreement about how war-
ranted they are [35, 72, 79, 84, 88]. Sunstein argues that nudges
do not threaten autonomy, as long as (1) they do not foreclose
options, (2) they do not impose significant costs on making any
particular choice, and (3) they aim to further the target’s interests
[84]. However, it can be difficult to determine whose interests, ex-
actly, nudges—especially digital nudges—serve. For example, unbe-
knownst to users, the nudges many mobile health (“mHealth”) apps
deliver are designed not just to improve user heath, but also to drive
users to buy sponsored products and services. Which is to say, they
“try to influence economic behaviours by way of merging health
and commercial content” [78]. Similar worries have been raised
about recommender systems [12, 60]. Ensuring that nudges are
“transparent”—i.e., people understand that they are being nudged
and toward what ends—can, to some extent, mitigate these concerns
[35, 59]. But given our reliance on recommender systems, and the
increasing sophistication of many digital nudges, concerns about
their effects on individual autonomy are likely to grow.
3.3 Economic Harm
Themanipulative influences that raise autonomy concerns have also
raised concerns about economic harm. Targeted advertisements,
recommender systems, and dark patterns that exploit either the
“widespread human biases” identified by behavioral economists or
the particular, “idiosyncratic” decision-making vulnerabilities of
individuals, threaten not only people’s independence but also their
wallets.
From an economic perspective, there are two potential problems.
First, dark patterns, product recommender systems, and manipu-
lative targeted advertisements might induce buyers to purchase
what they would not—on reflection—choose to buy, creating inef-
ficiencies in the allocation of goods (i.e., distributing products to
people who will not value them most) [110]. Second, manipulative
influences might enable sellers to charge more for products than
buyers would otherwise pay. Although sellers have always engaged
in what economists call “first degree price discrimination” and tech-
nology firms refer to as “price customization”—i.e., tailoring prices
to individual buyers, based on what is known about them—many
worry that the surveillance and dynamic experimentation digital
environments afford could supercharge these tactics [62]. When
that happens, overall economic efficiency is reduced and sellers are
able to “siphon rents,” claiming more than their fair share of the
surplus [101]. On the whole, as Calo writes, the rise of automated
influence technologies mean “A firm with the resources and inclina-
tion will be in a position to surface and exploit how consumers tend
to deviate from rational decisionmaking on a previously unimagin-
able scale. Thus, firms will increasingly be in the position to create
suckers, rather than waiting for one to be born” [14].
Moreover, as Zarsky points out, these technologies do not need to
“work”—in the sense of successfully influencing people to buy things
they don’t really want or to pay more for them than they otherwise
would—to introduce inefficiencies into the market. Even completely
ineffective targeted advertisements can irritate or stress consumers,
leading them to waste time and energy seeking out ad-blocking
technology, and generating general distrust toward sellers [110].
Similar concerns have been raised about product recommender sys-
tems. Many have complained, for example, that Amazon’s product
recommendations rely on fake reviews, wasting shoppers’ time and
leading to overall distrust in the site’s suggestions [67].
3.4 Epistemic Harm
Beyond concerns about privacy, autonomy, and economic welfare,
critical scholars have for many years warned about the grave epis-
temic harms that automated influence threatens—harms people
suffer as knowers. Almost a decade ago, Eli Pariser warned that
personalized digital environments seemed to be isolating people in
hermetic “filter bubbles,” only delivering news, media, and other
content that confirmed their prior beliefs and aligned with their
tastes, preferences, and values [74]. As Pariser pointed out then,
this can be detrimental to both individuals and society. Individu-
ally, people’s perspectives are narrowed, their intellectual horizons
diminished, and their beliefs polarized. Collectively, people lose
the sense of existing in a shared world, driving them to prioritize
personal interests over common purpose.
Not everyone is convinced that filter bubbles are quite so her-
metically sealed (at least not yet) [11, 27, 115]. And some argue
that traditional “legacy media”—especially cable news—is a more
significant driver of political polarization than digital technologies
[4]. The rise of internet-driven political disinformation, conspiracy
theories, and vaccine and other health misinformation, however,
are—for many—reason for persistent concern. A report from the
Data & Society Research Institute warns that digital technologies
enable a combination of surveillance, targeting, and automation—in
their words, a “digital influencemachine”—that can be “weaponized”
by malign actors [65], damaging both individual, autonomous and
collective, democratic experience.
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND ETHICAL
VALUES
So far, we have (1) surveyed the landscape of automated influence
technologies, illustrating how they work, some ends and purposes
to which they are applied, and the empirical research that investi-
gates whether and to what extent they effectively deliver on their
promises, and (2) described some of the many ethical concerns
about these technologies, raised by researchers and policymakers.
We illustrate some of our findings in two tables. In Table 1, we
point to the kinds of concrete research questions that motivate
much empirical work on the effectiveness of targeted advertising,
digital nudges, and recommender systems. In Table 2, we highlight
empirical questions generated by the ethics and policy literature.
While these sets of questions overlap in some places, we suggest
that the issues raised by ethics and policy research—the morally
relevant dimensions of these technologies, and their effects on in-
dividuals and society—are in need of more systematic empirical
investigation.
4.1 Privacy
Consider empirical questions about the effects of automated in-
fluence on privacy. Drawing from the discussion about privacy
in the previous section, we can see that determining whether or
not—or to what extent—these technologies impact privacy rests on
the following kinds of questions:
• “How much personal information is needed to effectively
target advertisements or content recommendations?”
• “Do people report feeling in control of their personal infor-
mation?”
• “Do individuals understand and consent to the data collection
practices fueling targeted advertising and other influence
technologies?”
• “To what extent are people capable of refusing/avoiding
tracking?”
• “Do people perceive targeting as invasive? Do they report
self-censoring in response to targeting?”
Table 1: Typical empirical questions exploring the effectiveness of automated influence technologies
Mode of Influence Application Domain Typical Empirical Research Questions
Targeted Advertising Commerce “Are users presented with targeted advertisements more likely to report
an intention to purchase the advertised product or service, relative to
generic controls?”
“Are users presented with targeted advertisements more likely to click
on them, relative to generic controls?”
Digital Nudges Health “Do users report higher physical activity levels after receiving targeted
digital nudges, relative to controls?”
Sustainability “Do car tracking technologies report better fuel consumption when
drivers receive targeted digital nudges, relative to controls?”
Recommender Systems Social Media “Do targeted recommendations drive users to spend longer on the
platform?”
Table 2: Examples of empirical questions generated by concerns raised in the ethics and policy literatures
Ethical Value Mode of Influence Relevant Empirical Questions
Privacy Targeted Advertising “Is targeting data collected with the consent of data subjects?”
“Do people think targeting data is collected in ways that are contextu-
ally appropriate?”
Autonomy Health Nudges “Are people aware that they are being nudged?”
“Do people understand why and how they are being nudged?”
Economic Harm Dark Patterns “Do particular dark patterns cause people to pay more than they other-
wise would for specific products?”
Epistemic Harm Recommender Systems “Are people susceptible to conspiracy theories or other forms of disin-
formation in proportion to the relative share of news and other media
they receive via targeted recommendations?”
Epistemic Harm Recommender Systems “Is public debate healthier/more robust in places where rates of e.g.,
social media usage, are lower?”
• “When asked, do people think targeting information is col-
lected in ways that are contextually appropriate?”
Related questions have been the subject of some highly signifi-
cant empirical research, though not necessarily in the context of
automated influence. For example, Acquisti et al. analyze people’s
sense of and ability to control their personal information [1], Mc-
Donald and Cranor investigate the costs (and opportunity costs) of
privacy consent procedures [58], and Martin and Nissenbaum use
survey instruments to explore how people understand privacy in
relation to context [54]. This work can serve as an important model
for future efforts. As new technologies for delivering automated
influence are developed and existing technologies evolve, research
into their effects on privacy will need to evolve along with it.
4.2 Autonomy
As we saw in the previous section, there are urgent, unanswered
questions about how automated influence technologies impact indi-
vidual decision-making—especially, the impacts of such influence
on individual autonomy. Whether or not particular vehicles of au-
tomated influence threaten autonomy depends on questions such
as:
• “Are the targets of influence aware that they are being tar-
geted?”
• “Do the targets of influence knowwhy they are being targeted—
i.e., do they understand the particular ends to which the
influence is designed to steer them?”
• “Do the targets of influence understand how the technologies
targeting them work?”
• “What characteristics do influence technologies target? Do
they seek to exploit people’s weaknesses and vulnerabili-
ties?”
• “How difficult is it for targets of influence to resist advertise-
ments, nudges, or other appeals?”
• “If targets of influence are briefed about having been targeted,
do they report feeling used or exploited?”
Bridging philosophy and HCI, Calvo et al. offer a framework for
understandingwhere autonomy is implicated in the design of digital
systems [15]. Some preliminary survey research has explored user
awareness of dark patterns [52] and user experience of dark patterns
as manipulative [33]. Mathur et al. raise related questions about how
to empirically measure the extent to which digital influences impact
autonomy, again in the context of dark patterns research [56]. We
echo their call for the development of new empirical strategies
that shed light on these questions, and suggest that such strategies
would be valuable for exploring the autonomy impacts of a range
of automated influence technologies beyond dark patterns.
4.3 Economic Harm
Of all the ethical issues raised in this paper, questions about eco-
nomic harm would seem to be the most amenable to empirical
measurement. For example, one might ask:
• “Do targets of influence actually pay more for goods or ser-
vices than non-targeted control groups? If so, how much
more?”
• “Do targets of influence return purchases or report regretting
purchases at a higher rate than control groups?”
• “How much time and effort do targets of influence spend
trying to avoid targeted appeals?”
Nevertheless, the law and policy literature investigating issues
such as algorithmically-enabled price discrimination and the effects
of digital technologies on consumer purchasing tends to focus on
the capabilities of technologies to inflict related harms, and the
economics literature relies almost entirely on theoretical model-
ing rather than empirical analysis. As we saw in the section on
targeted advertising, above, a small number of empirical studies
investigate the effects of targeted ads on how much individuals
report they would pay for a particular product, which could speak
to worries about price discrimination and the “siphoning” of rents
by sellers. But overall there appears to be a significant gap in the
literature: in the words of one scholar, there is “no consistent ana-
lytical framework and scant systematic empirical evidence about
platform markets and consumer welfare effects” [21].
4.4 Epistemic Harm
Finally, as discussed in the previous section, some empirical re-
search explores the extent to which content recommender systems
isolate people in polarizing filter bubbles (mostly finding insuffi-
cient reason for significant concern). And major efforts have been
undertaken to empirically study both the strategies utilized by ma-
lign actors to spread disinformation across social networks and
ways to mitigate that spread.6 Additional research is needed to un-
derstand the effects of these influences on individuals and society,
exploring:
• “Are people susceptible to conspiracy theories or other forms
of disinformation in proportion to the amount of time they
spend online, or in proportion to the relative share of news
and other media they receive via targeted recommenda-
tions?”
• “Are people more prone to confirmation bias/resistant to
countervailing evidence the more time they spend online,
6See, e.g., the work of the Data & Society Research Institute’s “Media Manipulation
Project,” Harvard’s Shorenstein Center on Media Politics and Public Policy, and the
Oxford Internet Institute’s “Computational Propaganda Project.”
or the more news and other media they receive via targeted
recommendations?”
• “Is public debate healthier/more robust in places where rates
of social media usage are lower?”
While some research in psychology and media effects investi-
gates related questions (and AI ethics researchers should aim to
build more bridges with these fields), there is little consensus about
their answers. A major review of the online disinformation lit-
erature concludes that understanding “the effects of exposure to
information and disinformation on individual beliefs and behaviors”
is a “key remaining research question” [91].
5 CONCLUSION
Our goals in this paper have been twofold: (1) to draw attention
to the landscape of automated influence technologies, to empirical
research that investigates them, and to ethics and policy scholarship
that raises concerns about their effects, and (2) to demonstrate that
while these literatures overlap in places more work is needed to
meaningfully integrate them. Measuring the effects of influence on
individual decision-making is already methodologically challeng-
ing, but equal attention should be paid to determining which effects
are measured.
For empirical research to inform ethics and policy debates it has
to describe and measure the specific morally and legally relevant
phenomena at their center, which requires carefully conceptual-
izing and defining empirical research problems through an ethics
and policy lens. Put another way, normative (i.e., “values”) issues
ought to drive the construction of empirical questions, rather than
the reverse. As we discussed in the previous section, examples
of such work exist—especially in more developed areas of policy
research, such as privacy studies. Critical and empirical scholars de-
velop projects together from the ground up, translating normative
questions into empirical ones. These collaborations offer models
for future efforts. We hope to have demonstrated the urgency of
this work, and to motivate and guide future research exploring
automated influence at the intersection of ethics and empirical
science.
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